In this paper we study the problem of long term capacity adequacy in electricity markets. We apply Cournot model of oligopoly behavior to formulate dynamic models that may characterize expansion planning in a competitive regime. The main aim of this work is to compare between three investment incentive mechanisms, such as reliability options, forward capacity markets and capacity payments. Rather than the oligopoly behavior, cartel and monopolistic structures are also analyzed. Stochastic dynamic programming is used to deal with the stochastic environment of the market (future demand) and the mixed complementarity problem formulation is employed to find solution of the game. The main finding of this study is that market-based mechanisms would be the more cost-efficient mechanism for assuring long-term system adequacy and encouraging earlier and adequate new investments in the system. Moreover, generators would exert market power when introducing the non-market based mechanisms. Finally, compared to Cournot competition, collusion and monopolistic situations lead to more installed capacities with market-based mechanisms and increasing end users payments.
Introduction
Policymakers in many countries are agreeing that competitive wholesale electricity markets are not presenting adequate incentives to stimulate sufficient investment in new generation capacity and the energy market itself 1 without any additional mechanism fails to guarantee the availability of generation. These concerns have been increased due to the uncertain growth of electricity demand, price volatility which makes new investment very risky and market power exerted by existing generators, especially in peaking period, by means of withholding capacity since no commitment is imposed on them. Some studies suggest that these factors coupled to serious market design flaws and other circumstances, has caused the California crisis in the summer of 2000, considered as the first failure of deregulation. It was characterized by extraordinarily high spot market prices, the rise of total energy costs to up to 10 times historical levels, and shortages and subsequent rolling blackouts within the state.
Another real problem which reduces market signals for attracting adequate investment in generation is the "missing money" problem. In fact, the competitive electricity price cannot, of itself, cover both the operating costs and the capital investment cost required to attract new investment in long-lived generation capacity to support a least cost generation supply portfolio consistent with mandatory reliability criteria. This concern would induce high and inefficient prices implicated by price manipulations in the market as well as an imbalance between the steadily growing demand for power and the limited increases in generation capacity.
The discussion above serves to illustrate why there are many proponents of designing electricity markets with some sort of investment incentive mechanisms, in addition to the spot market, which should be a solution to ensure long term reliability of electricity markets. Several mechanisms have been either applied or seriously considered at international level. They are classified in two categories. The first one is the non-market-based mechanisms. The most important one is the capacity payment mechanism 2 . It has been frequently used to compensate generators for improving reliability. These payments are important revenue sources for generating units that are scheduled to provide available capacity but would more likely not be called to produce electricity. Provisions for capacity payments have also been made out of concern that generators would not recover investment costs when only receiving energy payments from competitive generation markets. Generators are given in peak periods an additional capacity payment based on their availability (whether they get dispatched or not) or based on generated energy as an addition to the energy market clearing price. The problem with this mechanism is that no commitment is imposed on generator and therefore the level of adequacy cannot be guaranteed. Also, it is very complex to find a convincing way of determining the volume of the payment and the efficient capacity price. Another non-marketbase mechanism is the purchases of peaking units by the system operator. This approach is meant in order to avoid that the generation units that provide capacity at the margin may decide to leave the market when their revenues are too volatile or they are insufficient to cover at least their total operating cost. However, it is strongly interventionist and may interfere with the proper functioning of the market.
The second category is the market-based mechanisms. In a forward capacity market model, generation adequacy is ensured by giving consumers the opportunity to by ex ante the capacities' availability from generators. Every years, end users can contract enough firm generation capacity above their peak load to cover their expected peak load plus a regulated margin. This leads to the creation of a capacity market, in addition to the energy market, that allows trading generators' capacities. The capacity markets provide generators with the opportunity to collect extra revenue for their generation capacities and provide incentives for the building of reserves beyond the reserves that meet the short term needs for ancillary services. They are committed to have the contracted capacity available whenever they are required to produce, otherwise they pay a penalty fee. Joskow (2007) suggest that when generators are called to offer in the spot market their contracted capacity, they are also required to refund the consumers any infra-marginal rent corresponding to the difference between the spot price and the marginal cost of peaking unit. In other word, energy prices are capped by the competitive electricity price.
The second market-based mechanism is the reliability contract scheme 3 . It has the same objective as the first one, where the availability of generation has to be bought ex-ante, but it differs in its organization. Here, the system operator (SO) proposes a system of options to protect electricity buyers against too high prices on the spot market. Energy producers are rewarded for the insurance they provide and punished when they fail to supply the energy they have contracted upon. The options are marketed by the SO through yearly uniform price auctions. The SO determines in advance the strike price for the auction, which acts as a price cap for demand, and the time horizon during which the generator is required to generate the committed energy at any time. The SO will exercise his option whenever the energy price exceeds the strike price. The generators submit one or several bids to the auction, expressing quantity (the committed energy) and price (the required premium). Finally, the market is cleared as a simple auction and all of the accepted bids receive the premium that was solicited by the marginal bid. The call is represented as follows: consumers pay a premium to acquire the right to buy energy at the exercise price rather than the spot price and generators receive the premium for abandoning the right to sell at the spot price and for committing to sell at the exercise price whenever consumers exercise the option. On one hand, this method stabilizes the income of generators, who exchange an uncertain and volatile income (the energy price) for a certain one (the premium from the auction); on the other hand, it represents a marketbased mechanism to hedge demand against the occurrence of high market prices (since the energy price is capped by the strike price).
The motivation of the market-based mechanisms is to guarantee a regulated generation adequacy level for the system by defining specific commitment of generation and assuring that generators will be available when the system needs them because of scarcity of supply. They also give generators the opportunity to collect extra stable income in the market 3 Not tried in practice mechanisms, enabling them to cover both the operating costs and the capital investment cost required for new investment.
In this paper, we try to compare between three investment incentive mechanisms, capacity payment, forward capacity market and reliability contracts in term of long term capacity adequacy in uncertain environment particularly since there has been almost no previous research on how the market based mechanisms can deal with these problems in the long term. In other words, do such instruments, solve the problem of supply adequacy and at which cost? By long term system adequacy we mean the existence of enough installed available capacity of the appropriate characteristics to be able of meeting the estimated peak demand with efficient costs. We also show why the energy-only market would not give good signals for new capacity additions, and why an implementation of an additional incentive mechanism is needed to guarantee the availability of all generators, to attract new investments and to reduce market power.
In the literature, the problem of long term system reliability has been largely studied in a qualitative terms. Arriaga [2001] study the different mechanisms discussed above and indicate the weak and strong points of each one. Similar approaches to the reliability contract scheme proposed by Vazquez et al [2002] have also been described by Oren [2004] and Papalexopoulos [2004] . Joskow [2006] shows the existence of three real problems with competitive wholesale electricity markets that reduce the attractiveness of investments in new generation capacity: The lower level of competitive electricity prices (the "missing money" problem), their volatility and the frequent change in market rules and market institutions. He suggests that the introduction of a forward capacity market, in addition to the spot market, would be a solution to attract adequate investment in generation capacity. Doorman [2003] proposes a capacity subscription model where consumers have the freedom to choose their level of reliability through the amount of maximum capacity to which they subscribe.
However, there exist a few works that attempt to model the quantitative effects of various market designs. For instance, based on a system dynamic model, it is shown in Ford [1999] that, firstly, without incentives, construction cycles would occur frequently and the industry would face repeated periods of undersupply, and secondly, the introduction of a constant capacity payment could diminish considerably the occurrence of these cycles. The model presented in Botterud [2003] looks at the question of long-term generation capacity adequacy in restructured and competitive power systems where future demand is represented as a stochastic process. The results clearly show that a dynamic capacity payment is more likely to maintain an adequate level of installed capacity if demand grows faster or slower than expected. The model presented in Botterud et al [2005] calculates optimal investment strategies under both centralized social welfare and decentralized profit objectives. It is shown, firstly, that a price cap below the value of lost load or monopolistic investment conditions will contribute to postponing investment decisions further, and secondly, that a capacity payment will help trigger earlier investments, but can also result in too much investment in peaking units. De Vries [2004] develops a simulation model for the power system in the Netherlands. The model is used to analyse the effect of several of the capacity obligation mechanisms. The main conclusion is that mechanisms with a regulated volume of generation capacity are more robust than those that use economic incentives for stimulating investments. It is therefore argued that capacity obligations are the most attractive.
The work presented in this paper adds to the literature on modelling the long term effect of investment incentive mechanisms. Differently to the literature where competition is disregarded, we apply the Nash-Cournot model of oligopoly behaviour to formulate a threestage model that may characterize three decisions in an imperfect competitive regime: expansion planning, generation decisions and commitment decisions (commitment to produce when applying the market-based mechanisms).
In the energy area, a considerable literature deals with imperfect competition. However, only investment and production decisions are considered. Pineau and Murto [2003] Mixed complementarity problem formulations are largely used to find a solution to a Nash-Cournot model (Ventosa et al. [2002] , Gabriel et al. [2005] ). It takes advantage from the competitors' simultaneous decisions in a Nash-Cournot model and from its complementarity structure. In our study, we have two continuous decisions (commitment and production) and one discrete decision (investment). Each sub-model at the continuous decision stage is stated as a mixed complementarity problem in order to properly represent the equilibrium. However, a sequential Nash-Cournot solution is used to find the optimal investment choice.
In contract to the literature discussed above, a closed-loop solution is used in this paper to represent the interaction between all competitors' decisions. The method suggests that the three decisions are not decided at the same time. Investment decisions are made in the first stage, commitment decisions in the second stage and operating decisions in the third stage. The game is then truly a three-stage game where competition takes place in three steps. The generators play against each other when making investments, knowing how they will play against each other when participating in the mechanism and when operating their plants. This is also the case in the mechanism stage; they know their optimal future production decisions that depend on their actual commitment decisions. Due to the presence of uncertainty on future demand, stochastic dynamic programming is used to solve the overall problem 5 .
A good comparison between the open-loop and closed-loop solutions in electricity markets is proposed in Murphy and Smeers [2002] .
The main finding of this study is that market-based mechanisms would be the more cost-efficient mechanism for assuring long-term system adequacy and encouraging earlier and adequate new investments in the system. Moreover, generators would exert market power when introducing the non-market based mechanisms. Finally, compared to Cournot competition, cartel and monopolistic situations lead to more installed capacities with marketbased mechanisms and increasing end users payments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the assumptions used in our models. Section 3 outlines the proposed dynamic models formulations. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and the results from the application of our model to the French electricity sector. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
Modeling Assumptions
In this section, we describe the different assumptions made to formulate our NashCournot models of oligopoly behavior.
Four models are developed to represent each investment incentive mechanisms in an uncertain environment. Apart the general assumptions applied to all the models, there are specific assumptions that describe the functioning of each mechanism.
General assumptions
All the models consider a hiperanual scope divided into different time segments: periods and seasons. The periods coincide with years and each season set a group of hours with a similar demand level: plateau, off-peak and peak seasons.
We also consider the uncertainty on future demand. We assume that this uncertainty may be represented by a finite set of scenarios. Therefore, the stochastic evolution of the demand can be modeled by means of a Markov chain. Each branch represents a different realization of demand with its associated probability (see figure.1). 
Periods
A relevant assumption of the models is that three firms specialized in one technology type (plateau, off-plateau and peak technologies), compete in a Nash-Cournot manner. At each period, they decide the new capacity to be added in the system and at each season, they choose simultaneously the operation decision. When introducing the market-based incentive mechanism, they have also to choose the commitment decision (commitment to produce in the future period). The investment decision is a discrete variable which takes into account the construction delay that differs according to the technology type. We suppose also that if an expansion decision is made, additional investments cannot be made until the ongoing construction period is finalized. However, commitment and generation decisions are continuous and constrained by the generation capacity level.
Specific assumptions
We distinguish between three groups of market designs: the market-based incentive mechanisms, the non-market-based incentive mechanism and the benchmark case.
Market-based incentive mechanism: Reliability Options:
Besides investment and operating decisions, firms decide in an organized auction the committed quantity to be available in the future peak period. The auction is organized one year ahead of real time which corresponds to the peak season of future period. In this auction, the system operator (SO) purchases the commitment from generators to produce in the future a prescribed quantity of energy (highest expected peak demand). The method is base on the financial call option principle 6 . The SO sets the strike price and when the electricity price exceeds the strike price, system operator exerts his option and commits the generator to produce and to sell his committed energy at the strike price. Otherwise, they pay a penalty fee fixed at the time of the auction. Each generator submits one bid to the auction, expressing quantity and price (the required premium). The market is cleared as a simple auction and all of the accepted bids receive the premium that was requested by the marginal bid. The call is 6 A call option is the right (but not the obligation) to buy a stock, bond, commodity, or other instrument at a specified price (the strike price) within a specific time period.
Average demand represented as follows: consumers pay a premium to acquire the right to buy energy at the exercise price rather than the spot price and generators receive the premium for abandoning the right to sell at the spot price and for committing to sell at the exercise price whenever SO exercises the option. Consequently, energy producers are rewarded for the insurance they provide and punished when they fail to supply the energy they have contracted upon.
The overall game is represented as follow: at each period, firms choose the new capacity to be added in the system. Since the decision is discrete variable, we use the sequential Nash-Cournot method to find a solution. We suppose that there exist a leader firm (L) which decides first, a second firm (F1) operates as a follower of L and a third firm (F2) as a second follower of L and F1. After deciding the capacity addition, they compete to choose the quantity to be committed in the auction of the mechanism. This decision is a continuous variable and is found based on the mixed complementarity problem method (MCP). It is constrained by the expected generating capacity of the firm in the future year. Finally, at each season of the period, operating decisions are made, also constrained by the generating capacity level of the firm and the commitment decision made in the previous year. The game is then truly a repeated three-stage dynamic game where competition takes place in three steps. Therefore, a closed-loop solution is used to represent the interaction between all competitors' decisions. A detailed description of the resolution method is explained in section 3.
Market-based incentive mechanism: Forward Capacity Markets:
Similarly to the reliability options design, the main aim of this mechanism is to ensure the ex ante availability of generation. However, it's organized in another way. The commitment decision concerns here the firm generating capacity and not energy. Thus a capacity market is organized one year ahead of real time and the SO, on behalf of all demand, purchases a prescribed level of firms' generating capacities that allows covering the expected future peak load. The capacity market provide generators with the opportunity to collect extra revenue for their generation capacities and provide incentives for the building of reserves beyond the reserves that meet the short term needs for ancillary services. On the other hand, generators are committed to get available their contracted capacity whenever they are required to produce, otherwise they pay a predetermined penalty fee.
The capacity market is organized via auction procedure exactly similar to the first market-based mechanism. The single difference concerns the strike price. While it is exogenous and fixed administratively in the reliability options scheme, it is uncertain and endogenous in the capacity markets mechanism. In fact, when generators are called to offer in the spot market their contracted capacity, they are also required to refund the consumers any infra-marginal rent (see Joskow [2006] for more details) corresponding to the difference between the spot price and the marginal cost of marginal unit. This marginal cost can be considered here as an endogenous strike price.
The overall game is represented as in the first market-based mechanism and stated as a repeated three-stage dynamic game where competition takes place in three steps. Moreover, another variant of this mechanism is studied here. Instead of assuming that the capacity price is determined via auction procedure, we use a specific function that reflects the market's demand for capacity and expresses the relationship between the generator's payment from capacity market and the expected reliability in the system.
Non-market-based incentive mechanism: Capacity Pavements:
With this design, generators are given in peak seasons an additional capacity payment based on their availability whether they get dispatched or not. No obligation to serve is imposed on them and the additional payment given by the fixed capacity payment would compensate generators for improving reliability and incite them to invest in the system.
Here, the game is represented by a two-stage dynamic model: firms decide only the new capacity to be added in the system and operating decisions. The solution at each stage is found by the same method used for modelling the market-based mechanisms.
The benchmark case: Energy-Only Market:
Similar to the capacity payment mechanism, only investment and operating decisions are made by generators. Furthermore, no additional instruments are introduced here and generators' revenues are only provided by their sales in the spot market.
The Dynamic Models

Reliability Options model (Model A)
When introducing reliability options mechanism, as discussed is section 2.2, the objective of each firm is to maximize its profit -market and mechanism revenues minus operating costs and investment costs-for the entire scope.
The objective function to be maximized is described as follows:
For each firm, (1)
Subject to
The notation is defined as follows:
Period (year) = 1,2,3
Season (plateau, off-peak and peak respectively) Discount factor Specific constraints are omitted here and will be presented later. Constraint (2) shows that the capacity level of c at period t is only affected by investment decision made at − i.e. by taking into account the specific construction delay of technology. Constraints (3) and (4) prevent the firm's production from exceeding its installed capacity and the total quantity produced from exceeding the demand level. Constraints (5) and (6) concern the mechanism stage. The former one limits the generators' committed quantity in the auction of the mechanism to its expected installed capacity in the future period. The latter one prevents the total committed quantity from exceeding the quantity requested by the system operator.
Solving the model
Our game is a repeated three-stage dynamic game where competition takes place in three steps. First, at the beginning of each period, firms decide the capacity to be added in the system, which is a discrete decision (invest or not invest). The second stage concerns the commitment decision, . This choice is constrained by the expected capacity level of the firm in the future period and thus depends on the investment decision made in − + 1. In fact, when offering energy at the auction of the mechanism, firms are committed to be available and to produce at the future peak season, so they limit their offers to their expected capacity level
+1
. Finally, at each season of the period, they decide simultaneously their production depending on the demand level in the season and constrained by the capacity level. Moreover, in the peak season, generators have to fulfill their commitment made at the previous period (mechanism stage), so the production at this season is also constrained by −1 −1 . This game is repeated yearly over the planning period.
Given our game configuration, we use the closed loop information structure to solve the model where the solution is obtained by backward induction. Operating decisions are made on the basis of the observed investment decisions and commitment decisions. Commitment decisions are also chosen on the basis of previous observed investment decisions but with considerations of how operating decisions in the future peak season will be made. Similarly, investments decisions are obtained with considerations of how second and third stages decisions will be made. Except the difficulty generally encountered when using this technique, it is subgame perfect because the associated strategies are Nash equilibrium at each stage of the game, even if there has been a deviation from the equilibrium strategy in an earlier subgame, contrarily to the open loop information structure. We note finally that firms adapt also their investment decisions at each period to those made in the future. Consequently, stochastic dynamic programming method 7 is used to find all capacity additions for the total planning period. The essence of dynamic programming is Bellman's principle of optimality 8 .
In the further sections, we calculate the Nash-Cournot equilibriums associated to each stage of the game (operating, commitment and investment stages) and based on backward induction method, we start form the last decision until the first one.
Operating decisions stage:
At each season of the period, firms decide in Nash-Cournot manner the quantity to be produced. We distinguish between two classes of seasons. First, the plateau and off-peak seasons where production level is only constrained by the operating capacity level. The peak season where the mechanism plays and the commitments made at the last period (in the auction of the mechanism) become constraining.
a Plateau and off-peak seasons:
Generator c's sub-model associated to these seasons is represented as follows:
Subject to:
, In order to evaluate the possibility of price manipulations by generators, we use a linear function that expresses the relationship between the electricity price and the security of the system represented by − , , which is the difference between the demand level of the season and the total quantity produced. In the one hand, if there is no shortage in the system ( = , ), the electricity price is equal to , which is an approximation of the marginal cost of the expensive technology operating at this season. In the other hand, when there are shortages, the electricity price increase and more there is scarcity of supply − , ≫ 0 , more the price is high. This price formulation will be used later for all the models studied here. Furthermore, a quadratic function is used to represent the generator's total variable cost.
Each firm maximizes simultaneously its profit from the season s (7) under constraints (8) and (9). The Nash-Cournot equilibrium 9 is unique since the cost function , . is strictly convex and continuously differentiable, and the revenue function . . , is concave. The solution is found by grouping together all generators' first order optimality conditions, so a mixed complementarity problem 10 is formed. See appendix 1 for more details.
After resolving the model, we find the generator's optimal production decisions of the season, function of installed capacity at the period * , .
3.1.2.b Peak season:
In the peak season, as explained in section 2.2, the mechanism plays and the commitments made at the last period (in the auction of the mechanism) become constraining. The generator's sub-model associated to this season can be defined as: 
,3
,3 , ,3 , δ , , ≥ 0 ; free Where,
Strike price predetermined in the last period (auction of the mechanism) supposed to be lower than peak season electricity price (€/MWh)
Quantity produced by c that comes from his commitment (MWh)
Additional production of c after fulfilling his commitment (MWh)
The penalty paid by c per MWh of production below his committed quantity (€/MWh) A constant of the penalty function δ , , , Dual variables of the constraints
The first term in (10) represents the generator's income earned from his sales in the market. The electricity price is capped by the strike price −1 . for the quantity ,3 that comes for the commitment made at the auction mechanism. After fulfilling his commitment = ,3 , generator can offer an additional quantity ,3 in the market and receives the electricity price 3 (. ). The third terms represents the total variable cost of all quantities produced. The fourth term shows the penalty to be paid by the generator c whenever his commitments are not satisfied, ,3 . < . . The penalty is supposed to be endogenous to the reliability in the system, represented by 3 − ,3 . Constraints (11) and (12) show that generators have first to fulfill their commitments in order to offer additional quantities and to receive the electricity price. Constraints (13) and (14) prevent the firm's production from exceeding its installed capacity and the total quantity produced from exceeding the demand level.
Operating decisions at this stage are made on the basis of the last period commitment decisions. So when solving this sub-model, optimal operating decisions, and ,3 * = 0. Each generator produces his committed quantity whenever the total quantity sold by all generators at the auction of the mechanism corresponds to the demand level of the peak season.
-If Where, 1, , 2, , 3, constants depending on the strike price, the penalty, constants of the variable cost function of c and the total quantity sold in the auction of the mechanism. Generator c's production is a linear function of his committed quantity and the commitment of other generators whenever the total committed quantity exceeds the demand level of the season.
-If
and ,3 * = ( 3 , ,
). The generator satisfy first his commitment and could produce additional quantity depending on his installed capacity and the demand level whenever the total committed quantity is below the demand in the peak stage.
The reaction functions ,3 * ( −1 ) and ,3 * ( −1 ) are introduced now in the sub-model of the mechanism stage in order to find optimal commitment decisions.
Mechanism stage:
As explained in section 2.2 the system operator purchases ex ante the commitment from generators to produce in the future period a prescribed quantity of energy (highest expected peak demand). The method is based on the financial call option principle with auction procedure. We get the following assumptions for the realization of the auction: -The auction is organized one year ahead of real time.
-The time horizon: the peak season of the future period; the generators are required to offer their committed quantity at any time during that period. -The quantity purchased by the system operator on behalf of all demand equals the highest expected peak. -The system operator sets the strike price 11 , exogenously and corresponding to the actual marginal cost of marginal generator. -Each generator submits one bid to the auction, expressing quantity they want to sell and price (the required premium). -The market is cleared as a simple auction and all of the accepted bids receive the premium that was solicited by the marginal bid.
Knowing auction parameters, each generator maximizes the sum of his revenues from the auction and his expected profit in the future peak season. The associated generator's submodel is defined as follows: 
≤ ( )
, ά , έ , ή ≥ 0
Where, We suppose that each generator offers a "marginal" premium. This a reasonable assumption when players are single generating units acting alone in competition with other generators.
When participating in the auction, the generator knows that his revenue in the future peak season will be capped by the strike price. So his required premium would rationally incorporate the income that he will not receive from the spot market. It corresponds to the difference between the electricity price, found by making assumption that the generator doesn't participate in the auction, and the strike price. However, if the generator is a noncompetitive one and the electricity price cannot, of itself, cover both his operating and investment cost, he would formulate a premium that cover his expected total cost. So the premium requested by generator c is:
Where, The premium offered by the generator c (€/MWh)
+1
Electricity price in the future peak season, if generator c doesn't participate in the auction (€/MWh)
Unitary total cost of generator c's at future peak season (€/MWh)
,3 +1 ( ) Operating decision of generator c at the future peak season if he doesn't participate in the auction (MWh)
Rationally, each generator is incited to offer all his installed capacity in the auction. In fact, the premium earned from the auction will be at least equal to his required premium and participating to the mechanism will at least assure the same profit compared to the no participation. In this last case, he should take into account that his competitors will offer their installed capacity in the auction and therefore his expected operating decision is found by: 
After calculating the premium function specific to each generator, we can deduce the price of the auction (. ): = if is the highest and
Finally, it is important to note that the expected payoff in the future peak season . , as shown in section 3.1.2.a. However, due to the incentive given by the auction for generators to offer the highest quantity, we assume that: 
Investment stage:
After determining optimal operating and commitment decisions function of generators' installed capacity levels, we formulate a stochastic dynamic sub-model, which takes the form of bellman's equation, as described in Bertsekas (1959) , in order to find generator's investment decisions. These decisions are discrete one so a sequential NashCournot equilibrium is calculated by supposing that there exist a leader firm (L) which decides first, a second firm (F1) operates as a follower of L and a third firm (F2) as a second follower of L and F1 (see section 2.2). The decision rule gives the yearly decisions depending on the information available when the decisions have to be made, such as demand level, generators' installed capacities and past information about investment decisions.
The mathematical formulation of the investment problem is described as follows: 
Where,
Max expected payoff in period t (€)
+1
Optimal expected payoff in period t+1, corresponding to period t's optimal investment decisions (€)
. Future profits from period t to final period that correspond to generator's investment decisions made at period t Based on backward induction, the resolution starts from the end to the beginning of the planning period. At each period, generator c maximizes his expected total profit which corresponds to the sum of his period profit -market revenue plus mechanism revenue-and his optimal expected profit in the future period minus investment costs. We suppose that each generator pay a constant annuity calculated from the total investment cost that would be paid over the life time of the plant.
Due to the presence of construction delays that differ according to the generator's specialization, we suppose that if an expansion decision is made, additional investments cannot be made until the ongoing construction period is finalized.
Forward Capacity Market models (Models B1 and B2)
Two variants of capacity market mechanism are modeled here. The first one (Model B1) has the same assumptions as the reliability options one. The overall game is also stated as a repeated three-stage dynamic game where competition takes place in three steps: investment, commitment and operating decisions. In the mechanism stage, a capacity market is organized via an auction procedure where generators sell capacity (and not quantity) and they are committed to put it available whenever they are called in the future period (peak season).
For the second model (Model B2), we use a specific function that reflects the market's demand for capacity and expresses the relationship between the generator's payment from capacity market and the expected reliability in the system. We suppose that capacity price is determined by the capacity demand function, instead of auction procedure.
3.2.1: Model B1: auction procedure:
We use the same description and assumptions employed in Model A. However, the differences concern the sub-models of the mechanism stage and the peak season.
In the mechanism stage, as explained in section 2.2, the system operator purchases ex ante, via an auction procedure, the commitment from generators to have available in the future period a prescribed capacity level (highest expected peak demand). We get the following assumptions for the realization of the auction: -The auction is organized one year ahead of real time.
-The time horizon: the peak season of the future period; the generators are required to offer their committed capacity at any time during that period. -The capacity purchased by the system operator on behalf of all demand corresponds to the highest expected peak demand. -No strike price is explicitly defined but in the peak season of the future period, generators are required to refund to consumers any infra-marginal rents for their capacity they are contracted. We can so define it as an implicit strike price. -Each generator submits one bid to the auction, expressing capacity they want to sell and price (the required premium). -The market is cleared as a simple auction and all of the accepted bids receive the premium that was solicited by the marginal bid.
Compared to the sub-model used in section 3.1.3, the unique difference concerns the required premium offered by generators. It is redefined as: In fact, when generators are called to offer in the spot market their contracted capacity, they are also required to refund the consumers any infra-marginal rent corresponding to the difference between the spot price and the marginal cost of peak generator , (. ). While the strike price is exogenous and fixed ex ante in the reliability option model, it is endogenous and uncertain in this model. Therefore, the generator's profit associated to the peak season can be redefined as: 
As in model A, generators decide in the peak season the quantity to be produced that come from their commitments ,3 (. ) and if they fulfill their commitments, they can offer additional quantities ,3 (. ). The generator earns the spot price 3 (. ) for the total quantity produced, but he is required to refund consumers the infra-marginal rents for all his contracted quantity (second term in (26)). And finally, he pays a penalty fee whenever his commitments are not satisfied.
3.2.2: Model B2: capacity demand function:
Compared to model B1, the auction in the mechanism stage is replaced by a specific capacity demand function 12 , equation (27).
Capacity price (€/MWh) h and n Constants of the capacity demand function
The function expresses the relationship between the generator's payment from the capacity market and the difference between the quantity required by the SO and the contracted capacity. This function reflects the market's demand for capacity, where the payment increases as the reliability decreases.
The generators' sub-model in the mechanism stage is now reformulated as:
Due to the fact that the future peak season profit Finally, we note that optimal operating decisions and investment decisions are calculated by using the same formulation applied in Model A and Model B1.
Capacity payment model (Models C)
Generators are given in peak seasons a fixed capacity payment for their installed capacity whether they produce or not. The game is represented by a two-stage dynamic model. Generators compete in Nash-Cournot manner to find investment and operating decisions (no mechanism stage). The solution at each stage is found by applying the same method used for modelling the market-based incentive mechanisms.
The unique difference concerns peak season sub-model. It is reformulated as follows: 
A constant capacity price (€/MW)
Energy-Only Market model (Models C)
Similar to the capacity payment mechanism, only investment and operating decisions are made by generators. Furthermore, generators' revenues are only provided by their sales in the spot market. So, generator's sub-model for each season s is defined as:
, ≤
Investment decisions are found similarly to the market-based mechanisms by applying the stochastic dynamic programming method.
Comparison between investment incentive mechanisms:
The objective of this study is to find the optimal market design that could assure long term system adequacy at efficient cost and reduce price manipulations. Three criteria are used to evaluate the different market designs. The first one is the evolution of peak capacity margins within the planning period. The second is the evolution of average peak prices and total incentive costs paid by end users for each incentive mechanism. The third one concerns markets prices manipulation.
We also see how optimal competitors' strategies could change according to the structure of competition (competitive oligopoly, Collusion and Monopole).
Case Study
General input data
The parameters in the models are estimated based on historical data for the French electricity market 13 , and found in (Etudes DIGEC (1997) , Etude DGEMP (2003) and Powernext Bilan Statistique). We have referred to yearly historical data for load and electricity price in Powernext from 2001 to 2006 to estimate the parameters in the spot price model. Table 1 shows the main parameters used in the models. There are three generators which are specialized in one production technology (plateau, off-plateau and peak). Plateau generator detains 70% of the total initial installed capacities, the off-plateau generator detains 25% and 5% for peak generator. This distribution reflects the situation in many energy markets where a predominant generator having a large part of the power generating units. They are in competition at two stages: investment and production for all mechanisms and also at commitment stage for market-based mechanisms.
We firstly compare results between the different mechanisms when generators compete in oligopoly manner. Then, we repeat the analysis by supposing that two generators collude and compete with the third one and we finish by studying the monopolistic situation.
Results
This section is concerned with identifying optimal investments, generating and commitments decisions and studying, if investment incentive mechanisms i.e. reliability contracts, forward capacity markets and capacity payments could ensure long-term system adequacy. The capacity adequacy level is calculated using the capacity balance in the peak period. Optimal capacity adequacy is assured when the capacity margin is up to 4000 MW in the peak period and is at least positive. The best mechanism will be the one that both assures the optimal adequacy level and efficient costs for end users and reduces price manipulations. We also investigate the consequences on generators optimal strategies when different competitive scenarios are considered such as Cartel and monopolistic scenarios. We finally show the results of sensitivity analysis that concerns the main parameters.
A planning horizon of 16 years is used for the case study and the fifth market designs analyzed here are shown in table 2. Parameters in the different scenarios are estimated by assuming that additional payments will be identical at efficient thresholds. Indeed, in efficient competitive situation the premium earned by generators in the auction of RO and CM1scenarios would be close to the Table 1 Initial input parameters for the models investment cost of peaking unit which correspond to the "missing money" encountered in EOM scenario. We set so the capacity price in CP scenario to this amount. Moreover, in CM2 scenario parameters of the capacity demand's function are settled such as additional payment corresponds to the investment cost of peaking unit since the reliability in the system is assured.
Result 1: the introduction of investment incentive mechanisms lead to more capacity additions than the energy-only market design. However, only reliability options and forward capacity markets with auction procedure assure optimal capacity adequacy.
We can see from figure 2 that when introducing investment incentive mechanisms, the average capacity addition is higher from T6 to the end of the planning period, compared to the EOM design. This result confirms the theoretical predictions, which assume that economic signals of incentive mechanisms would intend to augment the volume of installed and available capacity and the reliability of the system would be enhanced. However, it is shown in figure 3 that form T10 to the end of the planning period, the capacity margin is higher than required in CP scenario, yielding overcapacity periods and is negative with CM1 scenario.
As we expected, since available capacities are doubly compensated when applying the capacity payment mechanism, generators have more incentive to invest in the system in order to profit from this higher revenue, and the capacity additions would increase slightly, yielding overcapacity situations, especially because no commitment to produce is imposed in them. In other hand, in CM2 scenario the remuneration given by the mechanism is endogenous to the security in the market(difference between expected peak demand and committed capacity), the more the commitment is high (security is assured), the more the remuneration decreases so generators choose to wait before investing until the system is close to rationing.
In RO and CM1 scenarios, additional payments given by the mechanisms (auction price) correspond efficiently to the cost of the reliability which is equivalent to the investment cost of the peak unit. The commitment to produce, which reduces market power, incites generators to invest only capacities that serve to meet expected future peak demand and long term capacity adequacy is assured in efficient manner. Due to the presence of demand uncertainty in our models, we complete our results by calculating the standard deviation of the future capacity margin. A figure 4 shows that is evolves similarly in the different scenarios and doesn't exceed 1500 MW.
Result 2: the market-based mechanisms provide lower peak spot prices.
With the market-based mechanisms (RO, CM1 and CM2 scenarios), average peak prices are the lowest (Figure 6 ). In the one hand, the exogenous strike price imposed by the system operator in the reliability options mechanism and in the other hand, the obligation for generators to refund consumers any infra-marginal rents earned at the peak period with forward capacity markets mechanisms, act as a price cap by preventing peak prices from reaching high levels, and thus consumers are fully protected from high prices in the energy market. With these mechanisms, consumers receive something (a maximum-price hedge) in exchange for all the capacity they are contracting. However in CP scenario, prices still high and closely to the energy-only market one. An important weak point of the capacity payment design is that consumers remain fully exposed to the potential high prices in the energy market, and they generally argue that they are paying a capacity charge and receive nothing in return. Also the lack of obligation to produce gives incentive to generators to manipulate spot prices. So, we can suggest that an application of a price cap in the energy market is necessary when applying this market design. Figure 7 shows the standard deviation levels of the future peak prices. They don't exceed 2€/MWh with market-based mechanisms. From results 1 and 2, we can suggest that the EOM scenario would not give good signals for new capacity additions and would lead to high prices and insufficient capacity adequacy, especially at the end of the planning period, so the implementation of an additional incentive mechanism is needed.
However, the capacity payment mechanism stimulates further capacity additions resulting in over-capacity situation nevertheless peak prices are the higher compared to other scenarios.
In order to best evaluate the market-based mechanisms, we calculate the cost paid by consumers for all the capacity they contract. Figure 8 illustrates the evolution of this cost which includes the peak price in the period and the specific incentive cost. It is stable and close to 105 €/MWh over all periods in scenario RC and CM1, while it is high and reaches great levels, up to almost 130€/MWh in CP scenario and to 160€/MWh in CM2 scenario.
Indeed, in this last scenario, specific incentive costs are largely dependent on to the security level in the in the system so, generators manipulate the prices in the capacity market by offering less than the quantity requested by the system operator.
On the other hand, in CP scenario the specific incentive cost is exogenous and corresponds to the investment cost of the peaking unit. In theory, the total cost paid by consumers in a period should be closely to those observed in RO and CM1 scenario, that is covering both the operating costs and the investment costs and resolving the missing money problem. However due to the fact that no obligation to produce is imposed on generators, they exert market power in the peak period which leads to shortages situation and high electricity prices in spite of the double remuneration of their installed capacities.
In RO and CM1 scenarios, the price of the contract (the premium) is set via a market-based mechanism, with a limited amount of regulatory intervention, giving a stable income for generators on one hand and hedging consumers from the occurrence of high prices and high additional incentive costs on the other hand. These mechanisms can be seen as a market compatible price cap where the problem of discouraging investments, induced by this price cap, is eliminated thanks to the incentive economic signal given by the stabilizing effects of the contract on the generators' revenues. Also, consumers would obtain, in exchange for a stable payment, a satisfactory guarantee that there will be enough available generation capacity whenever it is needed.
.
Result 4: generators exert market power when introducing the non-market based mechanisms
We now study how generators can manipulate electricity prices and revenues from incentive mechanisms. Figure 9 shows average energy balance in the peak period calculated by the difference between peak demand and generator's total production. Firstly, in CP scenario, it is closely to 15E 6 MWh over the planning period, even though capacity balance is positive. We can suggest that, every think being equals, a fixed capacity payment without commitment to produce cannot solve the problem of market power. Also, whatever the capacity balance level in EOM scenario, energy balance is positive and high and evolves closely to CP scenario.
Secondly, in CM2 scenario, energy balance is volatile and higher compared to RO and CM1 scenarios. This result is due to the lack of new capacity addition in the one hand and the possibility of price manipulations even if capacity balance is positive. Consequently, the system will often be close to rationing.
Thirdly, in RO and CM1 scenarios, average energy balances are the lowest one and evolve closely to zero. The extra revenue is stable over the planning period and the penalty imposed on generator whenever their commitments are not satisfied in the peak period reduce the incitation to manipulate electricity prices, and thereafter, at all times, generators offer the quantities that correspond to the peak demand. We study now how results could change in cartel and monopolistic situations.
Comparing outcomes in figures 10 and 11 to those in figure 3, notice that in RO and CM1 scenarios average capacity balance increases and reach an over capacity situation in monopolistic scenario. Indeed, in these situations generators can manipulate premiums in the auction of the mechanism and as a result, they increase their expected profit from the mechanism. Since this remuneration increase with the installed capacity, they are incited to invest more in the system until a non-socially acceptable range. However, in CM2 scenarios, average installed capacities decrease compared to the competitive scenario since the revenue from the capacity market is high in scarcity situations.
Moreover, as expected in theoretical predictions, aggregate profit increases as the number of non-colluding players in the industry decreases. This is proven in figures 12 and 13 where for all scenarios, average total cost is higher in cartel situation compared to competitive situation and reach a great level in monopolistic situations. scenarios, generators cannot manipulate spot prices and thus average energy balances are closed to levels observed in competitive scenario.
Result 6: Sensitivity Analysis: The level of the exogenous strike price and the penalty fee would have no effect on optimal investors' strategies.
In order to study the sensitivity of our results to the main parameters, we repeated the analysis by varying the exogenous strike price in RO scenario. In practice, this would not have a major effect since generators would increase their required premium, which includes the difference between the expected spot price and the strike price fixed by the operator. Not surprisingly, we find no variations in investments decisions and total mechanism cost. Indeed, premiums required by generators increase when diminishing the strike price and decrease when it rises, however the total mechanism cost don't change.
Similarly, the level of the penalty has no impact on our results since it is a least equal to variable cost of the peaking unit. Finally, we study the behaviors of generators when they offer in the auction of the marketbased mechanisms. Figures 16 and 17 show the evolution of auction price and consumer's surplus respectively in RO scenario. Auction price is the lowest in the competitive scenario and corresponds to the part that covers both operating and investment cost of the peaking unit.
However, in cartel and monopolistic situations, the auction price increases. Indeed, generators can now manipulate more the expected peak price that serve to calculate their premiums, by reducing their production level needed to calculate that price (see section 3.1.3).
Moreover, consumers' surplus, which corresponds to the difference between peak price calculated without commitments and total mechanism cost, is positive and increasing in competitive scenario though it is low and decreasing in cartel and monopole situations which confirms that auction prices are manipulated when generators collude. We also note that in CM1 scenario, generators behave similarly to RO scenario. Indeed, the difference between the two mechanisms concerns only the strike price but, the premiums requested by generators in the auction of the mechanisms are equivalent.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have illustrated, based on the dynamic programming method and mixed complementarity problem formulation, five stochastic dynamic models for addressing the problem of long-term capacity adequacy in electricity markets. Three investment incentive mechanisms, reliability contracts, forward capacity markets and capacity payments are analyzed and compared to the benchmark design, the energy-only market, in order to find the optimal market design that could ensure adequate new investments in the system and sufficient generation capacity to meet future demand at efficient cost and reduce market power. We apply the Nash-Cournot model of oligopoly behaviour to formulate a three-stage model that may characterize three decisions in an imperfect competitive regime: expansion planning, generation decisions and commitment decisions (commitment to produce when applying the market-based mechanisms). We also The main finding of this study is that market-based mechanisms would be the more cost-efficient mechanism for assuring long-term system adequacy and encouraging earlier and adequate new investments in the system. Moreover, generators would exert market power when introducing the non-market based mechanisms. Finally, compared to Cournot competition, cartel and monopolistic situations lead to more installed capacities with marketbased mechanisms and increasing end users payments.
This analysis could be extended in several ways. Firstly, we could study the effect of other mechanisms such as capacity subscriptions. Secondly, the feedback of the demand side to the implementation of an incentive mechanism could also be analyzed.
